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By now, ‘group interest’ has after all become a commonly
accepted concept, and one that implies dependency on the
parent company (B. Wachter, 1988).**
1. INTRODUCTION
The group, always a slippery legal phenomenon, is once again
drawing headlines. The catalyst generating this renewed attention
appears to be the European company law and corporate governance
Plan of Action that the European Commission announced on 12
December 2012.1 This initiative has been followed-up in 2013 by a
proposal from the Forum Europaeum on Company Groups (FECG)
to distinguish between Service Companies, being to a large extend
instrumental to the parent company, and Ordinary Companies,
which deserve a certain autonomy within the system of the law.
Service Companies should observe all directions from central group
management, Ordinary Companies should be given much more
leeway to structure their own businesses albeit taking good notice of
the group’s policies and interests.2
One of the suggestions put forward in the Commission’s Plan
of Action is indeed to have the concept of ‘group interest’
recognized by all Member States. No doubt this will also be part
of the final proposal for a European Model Company Act, which
is expected to be published shortly. It is unclear, however, how
recognition of such legal concept at the European level would
impact law practice in individual Member States, for example,
the Netherlands. Would it move the Dutch system closer to the
Anglo-American ‘shareholder’ approach, requiring greater alert-
ness and counteraction from Dutch subsidiaries’ management, or
would it in fact reflect an upward expansion of the ‘stakeholder’
concept preferred in the Rhineland region toward the holding
company level, with greater focus on other aspects and business
values besides shareholder value alone?3
However this turns out, I believe that recognition of the concept of
‘group interest’ in Europe will not cause any major changes in the
Netherlands. It is already established here as a relevant interest at law:
in statute, but also and more prominently in case law. This does not
mean, though, that recognition of this concept in European laws will
go unnoticed – nor does this in turn mean that the Supreme Court of
the Netherlands has approached the issue of groups over time with
sufficient consistency and a clear concept in the back of its mind.
This article begins with an attempt to sketch the Supreme
Court’s tentative approach using judgments that I feel are the most
noteworthy. I freely admit that the selection of judgments is
somewhat arbitrary and that I present them with little in the way of
nuance. It would likely be possible to write a PhD thesis on each
and every one of them.4 Nevertheless, I feel that a very rough
outline is the best way to discuss how the law has developed in this
area5: not to ignore the finer points, but to reflect the problems that
the Supreme Court has had with the subject matter over time,
which is the purpose of the present contribution. It ends with some
thoughts on the potential impact of European recognition of the
group interest on Dutch company law and the legal practice.
2. THE RISE OF THE GROUP IN DUTCH COMPANY LAW …
First, I discuss a related matter: recognition of the group as an
independent, legally relevant unit by sources other than the
Supreme Court. The group as such is already generally recognized
in the employee participation laws of the Dutch Works Councils
* Email: s.m.bartman@law.leidenuniv.nl or: bartman@bartmancompanylaw.nl.
** Translated from: B. Wachter, Concernrecht en bewijs(on)mogelijkheden, in the collection Van Vennootschappelijk belang, liber amicorum for Professor J.M.M. Maeijer LLM,
W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1988, p. 380.
1 COM (2012) 740 final, para. 4.6.
2 ECFR 2015, p. 299–306. This distinction by the FECG, intended to be laid down in a Directive, seems rather parallel to the one I suggested the judiciary to make between
Instrumental and Autonomous Subsidiaries, in my dissertation Concernbeleid en aansprakelijkheid, Kluwer-Deventer 1989, p. 116–120.
3 Cf. M(ieke) Olaerts’s column in the Journal European Company Law (ECL), Volume 13, Issue 3, June 2016, p. 89, titled The ‘European’ Group Interest and Stakeholder Protection.
Of course the recent “Brexit” puts this question in a somewhat different light.
4 For example, see my own efforts based on the Albeda Jelgersma II judgment, NJ 1988/487, notes by Van der Grinten, in my dissertation Concernbeleid en aansprakelijkheid,
published as vol. 6 in the series by the Institute for Corporate Law, Deventer-Kluwer, 1989.
5 See the discussion by G. van der Sangen, Concernleiding en aansprakelijkheid: het delicate evenwicht tussen unitaire leiding en juridische zelfstandigheid, TvOB 2009, no. 6, p. 146.
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Act (Wet op de Ondernemingsraden). Although the concept used in
that Act does not overlap entirely with the definition given in
Article 24b Book 2 Dutch Civil Code, 6 it is now generally accepted
that central works councils have specific group-based powers that
do not derive exclusively from those of their constituent works
councils. In fact, in 1998 this was more or less explicitly forma-
lized in the Act, specifically section 25(1). 7 That was not always
the case, however: as late as in 1981 Honée vigorously defended
the position that central works councils could not exercise advi-
sory powers that did not accrue to a majority of their associated
works councils. 8 This included decisions to form partnerships
with other groups or adopt strategic group plans. Honée refused
to acknowledge a ‘group-law interpretation’ of the Act (as it read
at the time). As noted above, however, ultimately the legislature
rejected this position (sometimes called the nemo plus principle),
‘as it is evident that this concerns matters that are of common
interest for all the associated undertakings, or at least the majority
of them ( … )’. 9
Since then, it has been primarily case law of the Enterprise
Division of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (hereinafter
‘Enterprise Division’) that has further defined the group for pur-
poses of employee participation. The Enterprise Division fully
recognizes the concept of ‘group interest’, although that interest is
not necessarily given decisive importance. Therefore, if the group’s
interests have not been evidently and comprehensibly weighed
against the interests of the individual undertaking, a resolution by
the undertaking (that is, the subsidiary) will not satisfy the
requirements of section 26(5) of the Works Councils Act. This line
of reasoning, which the Enterprise Division has long adopted in its
case law, is reflected in its judgment in Watts from 2013:
Given the fact that WINL is part of the Watts group, which
operates internationally, it is inevitable and logical that WINL’s
interests are determined in part by the group’s interests. This
does not diminish the fact that WINL, when preparing and
making its decision, should independently weigh the group’s
interests alongside or against WINL’s other interests and that
WINL should provide the works council with details of how it
weighed those interests. The group strategy carries weight in that
consideration, though not by definition decisive weight. Any other
view, to the effect that WINL should merely carry out a consolida-
tion decision taken at the level of WIEU, would unacceptably
prejudice the legal system of employee participation.10
My summary of Supreme Court case law commences with the well
known inquiry decision in OGEM from 1988.11 That judgment
(paragraph 9.3) contains the Supreme Court’s first reference to the
top-tier holding company’s powers of instruction that effectively exist
in intragroup relationships (and which can be enforced in a variety
of ways, including powers of suspension and dismissal) to obtain the
information from its subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries that it needs to
pursue sound group policies. Failure to timely demand and/or obtain
such information is not a valid defence against assertions of negli-
gence on the part of the parent company. As such, it is not at all
strange that Raaijmakers (Sr.) sees confirmation in OGEM of ‘( … )
the idea that the parent company’s shareholders (and other stake-
holders) may demand that the directors manage the parent com-
pany’s assets to the best of their abilities and conduct sound active
overall group management in respect of the subsidiaries’.12
Since that judgment, under Dutch law parent companies are
said to have a ‘duty of group management’ (concernleidingsplicht).13
Although the precise nature and scope of that duty have yet to be
fully defined, OGEM is nevertheless held to be a landmark decision
in the development of Dutch group law. In it, the Supreme Court
derives standards from facts (powers of instruction lead to a duty to
intervene) and so recognizes – albeit not in so many words – that
groups and group interests are legally relevant units.
Personally, I do not consider the much-debated decision in
Cancun from 2014 to be a step backward in this development.14
Following its judgments in relation to ABN AMRO and ASMI,15 it
was not to be expected that the Supreme Court would accept the
ground for cassation that argued (paragraph 1.9.2) that manage-
ment of a joint venture company should focus primarily on the
interests and wishes of the shareholders. Although this might be the
case in practice, until the laws change it is not a principle on which
Dutch company law is based.
6 Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 14 Mar. 2008, JOR 2008/94, notes by Holtzer (TNT/COR).
7 Act of 3 Mar. 1998, Dutch Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 107.
8 H.J.M.N. Honée, Concernrecht en medezeggenschapsregelingen, vol. 21 in the series by Van der Heijden Institute, Deventer-Kluwer, 1981, p. 164. For an alternative approach, see
my own Inleiding concernrecht, Samsom H.D. Tjeenk Willink, Alphen aan den Rijn 1986, p. 62.
9 Translated from: Parliamentary Papers II, 24 615, no. 3, p. 15 (Explanatory Memorandum).
10 Translated from: judgment rendered by the Enterprise Division, 9 July 2013, JAR 2013/223, notes by Zaal (Watts). For a similar judgment concerning rights of inquiry, see the judgment
rendered by the Enterprise Division on 8 Oct. 2013, JOR 2014/94, notes by Verburg (FNV c.s./Prins Dokkum). For more on this matter, see also the PhD thesis by L.G. Verburg, Het
territoir van de (Nederlandse) ondernemingsraad in het internationale bedrijfsleven, Monografieën Sociaal Recht no. 40, Deventer-Kluwer, 2007.
11 Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 10 Jan. 1990, NJ 1990/465, notes by Ma (OGEM). See also the notes by M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers on that judgment in
the collection Jurisprudentie Ondernemingsrecht 1897/2014, Ars Aequi Libri, 2015, p. 225 (hereinafter ‘AA collection’).
12 Translated from: M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, AA collection p. 225.
13 Cf. Bartman/Dorresteijn, Van het concern 107ff (8th ed., Deventer-Kluwer 2013, listing further reading).
14 Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 4 Apr. 2014, NJ 2014/389, notes by PvS, JOR 2014/290, notes by De Haan, AA collection p. 710, notes by
Raaijmakers (Cancun).
15 Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 13 July 2007, NJ 2007/434, notes by Ma, JOR 2007/178, notes by Nieuwe Weme (ABN AMRO) and the judgment
rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands on 9 July 2010, NJ 2010/544, notes by PvS, JOR 2010/228, notes by Van Ginneken (ASMI).
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The direction chosen by the Supreme Court in OGEM is also
evident in Sobi/Hurks from 2001, on the issue of piercing the
corporate veil.16 In paragraph 5.3.8.3 of that judgment, the Supreme
Court in fact in so many words refers to OGEM. The judgment also
confirms the earlier approach that the Supreme Court had adopted
to the issue of piercing the corporate veil in Albeda Jelgersma II,
which like OGEM was rendered in 1988.17 The essence of that
approach is that, where a parent company is closely involved in a
subsidiary’s business prior to that subsidiary’s insolvency, this cre-
ates an obligation for the parent company to actively oversee its
subsidiary in order to prevent (or at least minimize) any loss or
damage. This is sometimes referred to as a parental duty of care.18
The fact that the scope of this parental duty of care is not limited
to the subsidiary alone (internal operation), but also extends to the
subsidiary’s creditors (external operation), can be inferred from the
fact that any breach thereof may serve to pierce the subsidiary’s
corporate veil in favour of those creditors and, consequently, to the
holding company’s detriment. Confirmation of this can be found in
Comsys Holding from 2009.19 From this judgment we may conclude
that, although an entrepreneur is free to shape its business by using
multiple legal entities, it is obliged to compensate creditors of a
specific subsidiary if the chosen group structure created dispropor-
tionate risks for them. In the Comsys-case all costs of business were
allocated to one subsidiary, while all profits were made by another
one. The Supreme Court held that under these circumstances the
holding company was under the obligation to compensate the loss
sub’s creditors when it went bankrupt after the holding terminated
its funding.20
In the meantime, in 2001, the Supreme Court evidently felt that it
was necessary to take a step back. Apparently it felt that the evolution
of the group as a distinct legal institution threatened to go too far. In
Juno, which deals with directors’ and officers’ liability, the Supreme
Court held that management of a subsidiary may not determine its
positions based exclusively on the group’s interests.21 The court
considered (paragraph 4.6) that ‘[t]he interests of the group may
factor into this, but may not be decisive in that they take precedence
over the other interests concerning the separate companies’.
Presumably, the Supreme Court means that group interests are not
necessarily decisive, not that they may never carry the greatest weight
under certain circumstances22: the latter interpretation would be
impossible to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s presumed view of
corporate interests that requires that all relevant interests be considered
at all times.23 Inevitably, group interests will then sometimes carry the
greatest weight.
It should be mentioned here that Juno drew some criticism. In
her note on the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal of
Arnhem-Leeuwarden on the bankruptcy of the EAF group,
Verboom legitimately draws attention to the ‘confused’ position of
subsidiaries’ management in crisis situations.24 In her view, this
finding invites the following, somewhat drastic decision:
However, I do not feel that it is undesirable that the court now
seems to be accommodating the demand in professional literature
that the discrepancy between the economic reality of the common
figure of the group and the legal denial thereof be partially
eliminated, for example by attaching greater weight, when jud-
ging acts of management, to group interests and showing more
awareness of the economic practicalities of the group’s policies.
This problem is in fact what caused the Reflection Group on the
Future of EU Company Law (‘Reflection Group’) in 2011 to suggest
offering management of subsidiaries a safe harbour against the
threat of personal liability by recognizing the phenomenon of group
interests (see also below).25
Where Juno might be regarded as a degree of reluctance by the
Supreme Court to move forward in the process of institutionalizing
the group, in Landis (2005) it continued along the previously
adopted course. The judgment in that case marks an important
development in the ongoing institutionalization of the group in
Dutch company law, through recognition of what is commonly
known as a group inquiry.26 The law implies that only direct
16 Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 21 Dec. 2001, NJ 2005/96, notes by Kortmann, JOR 2002/38, notes by Faber/Bartman (Sobi/Hurks).
17 Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 19 Feb. 1988, NJ 1988/487, notes by G, AA collection p. 178, notes by PvS (Albeda Jelgersma II).
18 For example, see M. Olaerts, Herstructurering in concernverhoudingen: het vennootschappelijk belang, instructierechten en de autonomie van het bestuur van de dochterven-
nootschap, TvOB 2015, no. 6, p. 228.
19 Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 11 Sept. 2009, NJ 2009/565, notes by PvS, JOR 2009/309, notes by Spinath, AA collection p. 572, notes by Bartman
(Comsys). For an example of how the ‘Comsys doctrine’ has been applied in practice by a lower court, see the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal of Den Bosch on 25
Feb. 2014, RO 2014/38 (RGB Solutions/Med Trust). The concept of a duty of care as grounds for piercing the corporate veil is also evident in the judgment rendered by the
Court of Appeal of Leeuwarden on 6 Dec. 2012, JOR 2012/39, notes by Holtzer (KHE Group/FNV). For a recent example where the corporate veil was pierced in preliminary
relief proceedings, see the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam on 13 Jan. 2015, JIN 2015/49, notes by Tersteeg.
20 See for piercing the corporate veil in an international, but Dutch related, legal setting: Cees de Groot, The ‘Shell Nigeria Issue’: Judgments by the Court of Appeal of the Hague, the
Netherlands, ECL June 2016, p. 96 and Steef M. Bartman, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Haitian poisoning Affair Rejected in Firts Instance: German Helm AG not found Liable
under Dutch Corporate Law, ECL June 2016, p. 103.
21 Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 26 Oct. 2001, NJ 2002/94, notes by Ma, JOR 2002/2, notes by Bartman (Juno).
22 Cf. Asser/Maeijer, Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2-II* 2009/827.
23 Cf. Casper Hamersma & Rik Mellenbergh, Derdenwerking van het vennootschappelijk belang, Ondernemingsrecht 2013/58.
24 Judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal of Arnhem-Leeuwarden, 12 Nov. 2013, JOR 2014/32, notes by Verboom (Rosenberg Polak q.q./Van Ommen).
25 Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law, 2011. In this connection, see J.N. Schutte-Veenstra & M.A. Verbrugh, Openbare raadpleging over de toekomst
van het Europese vennootschapsrecht; een kritische bespreking, Ondernemingsrecht 2012/136.
26 Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 4 Feb. 2005, NJ 2005/127, notes by Ma, JOR 2005/58, notes by I, AA collection p. 512, notes by Raaijmakers
(Landis).
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providers of the company’s risk capital (holders of shares and
depositary receipts) may apply to the Enterprise Division to inves-
tigate the company’s policies and business, provided there are
justified and serious doubts regarding the quality of such policies
and business (Article 346(1)(b) and (c) Book 2 Dutch Civil Code).
Yet in Landis the Supreme Court found that indirect capital pro-
viders may also initiate inquiries, through their capital holdings in
the parent company: not only aimed at that parent company, but
also at its subsidiaries. The implication is that if mismanagement is
established by the Enterprise Division this court may then also
impose final injunctions on both the parent company and any
subsidiaries that fall within the scope of the investigation pursuant
to Article 356 Book 2 Dutch Civil Code, for example, the dismissal
of and appointment of new directors, the amendment of the articles
of association, the transfer of shares to a trustee, and so on.
This is necessitated by the economic reality of group relation-
ships, the Supreme Court explained. Within a close group, the
policies and business at the level of the subsidiary also impact the
interests of the holding company’s capital providers: after all, the
parent company conducts its business with input from its subsidi-
aries. For purposes of the right of inquiry, the group is much more
relevant as a unit than the individual group companies.27 Here,
recognition of the phenomenon of a group inquiry is a logical
reflection of the earlier recognition of the holding company’s group
management duty.
Lastly, the institutionalization of groups in Dutch company law as
presented here culminates in Bruil (2007). On the question of
whether a particular juristic act or decision creates a conflict of
interests for a member of management, the Supreme Court explicitly
made an exception for the group’s shareholders/directors (para-
graph 3.6):
Particularly in cases where a natural person acts in the capacity of a
director of and at the same time shareholder inmultiple companies
that together make up a group, conflicts of interests within the
meaning of article 256 Book 2 will be uncommon, since it is in fact
the intention that by retaining ultimate control in one place the
consideration of all the interests involved in these group companies
is concentrated with that person. In that situation, the interests of
the company and its associated undertaking and the interests of the
director/shareholder in question correspond so closely that con-
flicts will only arise in very extraordinary circumstances.28
In paragraph 3 of his note in NJ to this judgment, Maeijer
legitimately raises the rhetorical question of why this exception
should not similarly apply to a holding company at the head of a
group. Assuming that it does, this group exception undeniably
echoes the view that groups as distinct legal institutions are
commonly characterized by parallel interests, owing precisely to
the central control from the parent company, where the group’s
interests form the connecting Leitmotiv.29
3. … BUT NOT TOO FAST
On typical company law matters – for example employee parti-
cipation, rights of inquiry, piercing the corporate veil and con-
flicts of interests – the Supreme Court is arguably unafraid to
recognize the group as a relevant unity. However, it is consid-
erably more reluctant to do so in respect of themes that tradi-
tionally fall more within the sphere of property law. This was
already visible in Juno, in connection with directors’ and officers’
liability for torts. The same goes for the issues of contribution
obligation within the context of group financing and joint and
several liability based on a guarantee under Article 403 Book 2
Dutch Civil Code.
That reluctance – which might perhaps better be typified as
indecision – in terms of the group financing contribution obliga-
tion is strongly present in JVS Beheer from 2012.30 What appor-
tionment key should the court in the fact-finding instance apply
where the group companies, as is common practice, have omitted
to arrange this among themselves? Given the earlier judgment in
Rivier De Lek from 2003,31 the Supreme Court might be expected to
again attribute decisive weight to the fact of a group relationship, in
the form of a proportionate obligation to contribute unless fairness
demands otherwise, yet following JVS Beheer this is more hope than
expectation.32
The Supreme Court evidently was unable to reach a decision
when phrasing its judgment. It falls back on a section from the
Parliamentary history to Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code that
does little to provide clarity, and finally simply refers the fact
finding court to ‘all other relevant circumstances surrounding
the matter’. It remains unclear whether factors such as indirect
profit from intercompany transactions might also be considered
in connection with the apportionment of the contribution
27 However, this does not mean that group inquiry should be seen as a specific category within the right of inquiry compared with those of others with derived rights. On this
matter, see my contribution entitled Het goudschaaltje van Ingelse, in the collection: Ik ben niet overtuigd, Opstellen aangeboden aan mr. P. Ingelse, Ars Aequi Libri 2015, p. 43.
28 Translated from: judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 29 June 2007, NJ 2007/420, notes by Ma, JOR 2007/169, notes by Leijten/Bartman (Bruil). In
this connection, see also my analysis entitled From Autonomy of Interests to Concurrence of Interests in Dutch Group Company Law, European Company Law (ECL), Oct.
2007, p. 207.
29 Cf. Bartman/Dorresteijn, supra n. 13, at 287.
30 Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 13 July 2012, NJ 2012/447, JOR 2012/306, notes by Bergervoet, AA collection p. 663, notes by Bartman (Janssen q.
q./JVS Beheer). See also my article titled The Obligation to Contribute in the Case of Group Financing under Dutch Law: How to Allocate the Pain?, European Company Law
(ECL), Volume 10, issue 1, 2013, p. 15–20.
31 Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 18 Apr. 2003, JOR 2003/160, notes by Bartman (Rivier De Lek).
32 Cf. Bartman/Dorresteijn, supra n. 13, at 277.
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obligation, and if so to what degree. This issue almost becomes
a classic one that keeps returning, where the question is asked
again and again of how the reality of the group can be reflected in
the system of legal apportionment.33 The persistent recurrence of
this theme caused Rijkers, in her notes to JVS, to lament, ‘One
might wonder if it is not simply intrinsic in the matter that group
companies should in principle share in the group’s debts’.34
The Supreme Court’s case law on joint and several liability
under what are commonly known as ‘403 parent guarantees’
(403-verklaringen) also reveals its concern about awarding
group relationships special meaning and weight in this area.
The 403 parent guarantee serves as one of the requirements
under Dutch law to exempt a subsidiary from the obligation to
publish its own annual accounts.35 For example, in SNS (2014)36
the Supreme Court, to establish the price of expropriated SNS
bonds, was faced with the task of determining whether the
claims were subordinated not only in the capital of SNS Bank
NV (the issuer), but also in the capital of its parent company
SNS Reaal NV. They were not, the Supreme Court ruled, since
SNS Reaal was a third party, and nothing more, in respect of
SNS Bank’s creditors. The Supreme Court held as follows
(paragraph 4.34.4):
The circumstance that the creditors involved have agreed on
subordination with SNS Bank only has bearing on their posi-
tion in the event of recourse against SNS Bank’s capital. If the
contracts ‘have no bearing’ on these creditors’ recourse posi-
tion in respect of a third party, as established by the enter-
prise division, this Court sees no reason why ( … ) the risk
that the creditors have accepted in their dealings with SNS
Bank should also apply in respect of such third parties. ( … )
A subordination clause that a creditor has agreed with SNS
Bank therefore has no influence on that creditor’s recourse
against the capital of a third party, for example SNS Reaal,
which under a 403 guarantee is jointly and severally liable for
the contract in question and was not party to the subordina-
tion clause.
Given that – again – the parent company and the subsidiary
operated largely as a single economic unit, it is somewhat cur-
ious that the Supreme Court qualified SNS Reaal NV as a
complete outsider in respect of its subsidiary’s creditors. Nor
does it presumably properly reflect the manner in which the
bondholders viewed the SNS group when they agreed to the
subordination. In this situation, evidently, the legal reality and
the legal perception diverge. The view of the group that is
evident from the text quoted in any case has little in common
with the previously discussed institutional view that is evident in
other case law of the Supreme Court.
4. EVALUATION AND FINAL CONCLUSION
Based on this overview of the Supreme Court’s case law, it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Court has trouble placing
the phenomenon of groups in Dutch company law. Although in
some judgments it seems to lovingly embrace the group (OGEM,
Albeda Jelgersma II, Landis, Bruil), in others it seems to trigger
alarm among the Supreme Court and cause it to shrink back (Juno,
JVS Beheer, SNS). This is not necessarily very surprising: company
law is a random collection of rules ranging from organizational
laws to accountability and liability laws and pure property laws.
Since all these separate areas serve different purposes, it is under-
standable that the Supreme Court displays a variety of attitudes in
respect of the group as an entity for which the Dutch legal system
does not make a specific and detailed provision.
The Supreme Court’s view of the group, being the most
common form of undertaking, as a relevant unit for giving shape
to employee participation and accountability by management
through inquiry rights illustrates only that the country’s highest
court refuses to ignore reality. It would require a great deal more
courage to link group financing contribution obligations to
profit forms that cannot easily be directly and quantifiably
identified as increases in a group company’s capital. It would be
equally bold to rule that a contract of subordination with a
subsidiary should also apply at the level of a parent company that
is not party to the contract: the potential impact on the basic
principles of property law in this country is the reason for the
Supreme Court’s caution.
Does this analysis represent a complete overview of the current
situation of group law in the Netherlands? No: last but not least some
words should be spent on the classical theme of piercing the corporate
veil. What strikes me in this connection is that, although the Supreme
Court is willing to attribute an upward liability-apportioning influence
to groups, based on the parental duty of care (Albeda Jelgersma II,
Sobi-Hurks, Coral-Stalt, Comsys), no downward absolving influence
based on the same considerations has to date been recognized. As
discussed the holding company and its management are required to
intervene in the subsidiary’s business at a particular moment in
time, or become obliged to pay damages to its creditors, yet I am
unaware of any conclusive judgment in which the director of a
33 For what to my mind is still one of the most convincing analyses of this issue, see J.M.H.P. van Neer-Van den Broek, Enige gedachten over hoofdelijkheid, omslag en regres, in the
collection: Handelsrecht tussen ‘Koophandel’ en Nieuw BW, Deventer-Kluwer, 1988, p. 115.
34 Cf. D.H.J. Rijkers, Draagplichtverdeling bij concernfinanciering: wie krijgt de schuld?, V&O 2012, no. 10, p. 172. See also P.P. Jongen, M&A: Regresrisico bij uitvaren
dochtervennootschap uit concernfinanciering, Bb 2015, vol. 6, p. 61, and A.W.N. Oomen, Externe aansprakelijkheid en/of interne draagplicht?, JuTD 2012, no. 21, p. 16.
35 As permitted in Art. 57 of the Fourth EC Directive on annual accounts.
36 Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 20 Mar. 2015, NJ 2015/361, notes by PvS/Winter, JOR 2015/140, notes by Josephus Jitta, JIN 2015/82, notes by
Van der Kraan (SNS).
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subsidiary successfully argued that he or she had acted at the
instructions of the parent company.37
In this connection I have already mentioned Juno, and I share
Verboom’s criticism on this judgment. I too feel that the group’s
interests, as seen by group management, should in principle decide
the actions of the subsidiary’s management. Naturally, a lower limit
should apply, viz. breaches of third parties’ rights or dispropor-
tionate negligence in respect of the company’s own interests. I also
believe that ‘safe harbour’ is not the appropriate term here: the
subsidiary’s management must always check the lawfulness and
practicality of the parent company’s instructions. Nevertheless, it
is possible that recognition of the concept of ‘group interest’
within the EU will cause the Supreme Court to recognize the
downward absolving effect of the group in the near future.
Specifying concrete powers of instruction in the subsidiary’s arti-
cles of association, based on Article 239(4) Book 2 of the Dutch
Civil Code as introduced in 2013, will presumably help in this
regard.38
Of course a converse effect may also occur. The longer cen-
tral group management delays in shaping its authority by way of
creating a formal instruction right in its subsidiary's articles of
association, the more difficult it will become to convince the judge
in a potential case that the latter's interest should be set aside in
favour of the group's interests. Modern principles of corporate
governance require the legal relations within the group to be clearly
structured. Should group management fail to do so it will not just
lead to the absence of an instruction right but it may also lead to
further consequences. In this respect one could say that Article 239
(4) of the Dutch Civil Code, in combination with an even stronger
recognition of the group interest in our system of company law,
forces the holding company to be more clear about the nature of
its relationship with subsidiaries. In my view this is a good
development.
At the same time, general recognition of the group interests
throughout the EU might cause a small revolution in the appor-
tionment of the duty to provide facts and proof in disputes between
parent companies and their subsidiaries.39 This aspect of proce-
dural law has its roots in substantive law. If the group interests (as
perceived by group management!) becomes an integral part of
Dutch company law, it would be the responsibility of the subsidi-
ary’s management to argue and prove that carrying out a particular
instruction infringes on third parties’ rights, or else presents too
much risk for the individual company’s interests. This shift in the
burden of proof in legal proceedings might in fact be the most
concrete consequence of the introduction of an EU-wide group
interest for Dutch legal practice.
37 An example is available in case law in a lower instance, albeit that the case concerned internal liability of directors and officers pursuant to Art. 9 Book 2 Dutch Civil Code. See
the judgment rendered by the District Court of Amsterdam, 12 Jan. 2011, JOR 2011/250, notes by Bulten (Canicula/ING Trust). See also in this context the judgment of the
Court of Appeal of The Hague, 26 Nov. 2015, JIN 2015/199, notes by Wolf (Culi d’Or), in which the Court held that a group may be managed as a sole business and that,
consequently, intragroup loans need not necessarily be secured, provided that it is not foreseeable that the company to which the loan is granted will get into financial trouble
shortly thereafter.
38 Alternatively, if I understand him correctly, see R.G.M. Dahmen, De aanwijzingsbevoegdheid van het gewijzigde artikel 2:239 lid 4 BW: toepassing, toetsing, afdwingbaarheid en
aspecten van aansprakelijkheid in concernperspectief, TvOB 2014-2, p. 61. An interesting case in this respect is the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal of Arnhem-
Leeuwarden, 11 Aug. 2015, JOR 2015/326, notes by Van Thiel (X c.s./Gustenhoven q.q.).
39 Cf. Bartman/Dorresteijn, supra n. 13, at 96.
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